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• Empirical challenges and ways to address them
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Policy interest
• Strength of patent rights
• Interplay with post-grant review systems (e.g. PTAB in U.S.)
• Lots of litigation especially in information and communication
technology (ICT) industry
• Litigation due to so-called patent assertion entities (PAE) aka patent
trolls
• Patent litigation involving standard essential patents (SEPs)
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How should the system be designed?
• Allow patent owners to enforce a patent if infringement is detected
• Allow defendants to challenge patent’s validity
• But also:
• Discourage strategic behavior
• Deter plaintiffs from seeking ‘overly broad’ injunctions or ‘excessive’
damages
• Deter nuisance lawsuits
• Discourage defendants from driving up enforcement costs to deter
assertion or force settlements
• System should strike balance between allowing patent owners
to enforce their rights and to obtain appropriate remedies while
avoiding incentives for excessive litigation
• Is the litigation system achieving that objective?
Ganglmair, Helmers, Love Empirical Analysis 11 September 2019 4 / 33
Empirical questions
• How much litigation is there?
• Can we test validity of assumptions made by different theoretical
models of litigation (Shavell, 1996; Gelbach, 2018; Helland et al.,
2018)?
• Design of litigation system – specific aspects:
• Bifurcation and sequential trials
• Fee shifting
• Forum shopping
• Evaluate effect of specific litigation activity: NPEs, SEPs
• Legal, institutional, legislative changes::
• Frequent changes in the law and its application especially in common
law jurisdictions (e.g. in U.S. Mayo v. Prometheus 2012, CLS Bank v.
Alice 2014)
• Institutional changes (e.g. reform of IPEC in UK including SCT,
introduction of opposition procedures in Japan and Korea in 2015 and
2017 respectively)
• Legislative changes (AIA in the U.S.)
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Empirical analysis
• Challenges for quantitative analysis of patent litigation:
(1) Complexity of patent litigation (see Lecture 1)
(2) Observability of information
• Some information unobservable (private information exchanged
between parties)
• Information in principle observable, but unavailable (e.g. terms of
private settlement)
• Information in principle observable, but missing at random or not (e.g.
only judgments published, pre-trial motions are not)
(3) Large heterogeneity among court cases (see Lecture 3)
(4) Any observable information is the outcome of non-random choice:
selection
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Selection
• Selection biggest problem in cause-effect analysis
• Observed data outcome of optimizing behavior by the parties:
(1) Selection into court filing
(2) Selection conditional on claim filing
(3) Selection into settlement/judgment
(4) Selection into appeal
• Why does it matter?
• How would you answer the following research question:
What was the impact of a specific legal/institutional change on
litigation behavior (claims filed, plaintiff win rate, etc.)?





1 if i files claim
0 otherwise.
• 2 “potential” outcomes for individual i (only 1 outcome realized)
• Outcome if does not file claim: Y0i
• Outcome if files claim: Y1i
• Causal effect of filing claim:
κ = Y1i − Y0i (1)
• Rewrite:
Y1i = Y0i + κ (2)
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Reminder: Selection
• This means we can write:
Avgn[Y1i|Di = 1] = κ+Avgn[Y0i|Di = 1] (3)
• Subtract Avgn[Y0i|Di = 0]:
{Avgn[Y1i|Di = 1]−Avgn[Y0i|Di = 0]}︸ ︷︷ ︸
Difference in group means
=
xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxκ+ {Avgn[Y0i|Di = 1]−Avgn[Y0i|Di = 0]}︸ ︷︷ ︸
Selection Bias
• This means:
difference in group means = average causal effect + selection bias
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1: Selection into court filing
• Only complaints filed with a court are
observed
• Disputes resolved or dropped before
plaintiff files complaint unobservable
• Survey results for the U.S. suggest
70% of patent infringement claims
never reach a court (Lemely et al.,
2017)
• Unclear how to account for this type
of selection
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1: Selection into court filing: implication
• Assume some legal or institutional change
• Observable: increase in the number of cases litigated in court
Out 
Before After 
In court In court 
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2: Selection conditional on court filing
• Some cases dropped after claim filing
(claim form only document)
• Defendant acknowledges service and
files response (counterclaim)
• If case proceeds, parties interact and
make series of decisions (litigant
controlled motions that force
exchange of information)
• Amount of information available
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2: Selection conditional on court filing
• Court may dismiss the case
• Parties may settle at any point –
decision to settle depends on set of
factors
• If case settled, usually no information
revealed about terms of settlement
(e.g. potential payments, licensing
agreements etc.)
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3: Selection into judgment – no settlement
• Theory showed that
settlement process acts as a
“filter” on filed cases
• Empirically this means that
small and non-random
subset of cases not settled
(although ultimately empirical
question)
• Decided cases are not
representative of all patent
disputes filed with court, even
less so of all patent disputes
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3: Selection into judgment – no settlement
• Important implication (Shavell,
1996; Gelbach, 2018):
• Any plaintiff’s win rate can be
observed among litigated cases
• Cannot infer anything about
underlying causes from observed win
rates
• Interpreting win rates requires theory
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4: Selection into appeal
• Cases decided on appeal even
more highly selected subset of
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Selection
• How to address selection?
• In practice often simply ignored (“[W]e do not control for selection.
Rather, we ask, given any selection that occurs, is there any
remaining association between patent and patentee characteristics
and the outcomes?” (Lanjouw and Schankerman, 2004))
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Reminder: Differences-in-differences
• Differences-in-differences (diff-in-diff) method works when there is
selection
• Need ‘treatment’ and ‘control’ groups (e.g. one type of cases affected
by Supreme Court decision, another is not)
• But treatment and control groups can differ for many reasons
• Main assumption: treatment and control outcomes move in
parallel in the absence of treatment
• Effect obtained from divergence between treatment and control group
post-treatment
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Reminder: Differences-in-differences
• Diff-in-diff has 3 ingredients (assuming 1 treatment and 1 control
group):
Yit = α+ βTi + γPt + δrDD(Ti × Pt) + eit (4)
(1) A dummy for the treatment Ti that varies across treatment and control
groups – inclusion of Td controls for fixed differences between the units
being compared
(2) A dummy for post-treatment periods Pt that varies over time –
inclusion of Pt controls for the fact that conditions change over time
for everyone, whether treated or not
(3) Interaction term Td × Pt – the coefficient on this term is the diff-in-diff
causal effect.
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Reminder: Regression discontinuity
• Often changes in legal system occur on a specific date or decisions
happen within fixed time periods (e.g. institutional/legal change
takes effect on specific date; institution decision at PTAB)
• This means that treatment is a deterministic function of time
• If change generates a discontinuity in the data, can use Regression
Discontinuity Design (RDD)
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Reminder: Regression discontinuity
• Define treatment as
Di =
{
1 if time t ≥ t∗
0 otherwise.
(5)
• Treatment status is a deterministic function of t
• Treatment status is a discontinuous function of t, no matter how close
t gets to cutoff t∗, Di remains unchanged until cutoff is reached
• Sharp v fuzzy RDD
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Instrumental Variable (IV): Judge Fixed Effects
• Individual judges affect outcomes
• Heterogeneity among judges
• Key institutional feature: random assignment of cases to judges
(exclusion restriction)
• Key idea: binary outcome of cases i 6= j valid IV for outcome of case
i if same judge in i and j
• Widely used in analysis of court decisions for a long time
• Application to patent litigation: Galasso and Schankerman (2015)
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Reminder: Instrumental Variable
• IV requires:
• IV has a causal effect in first-stage (direct effect of IV on
treatment)
• IV is unrelated to the omitted variables (independence assumption)
• Single channel through which the IV affects outcomes (exclusion
restriction)
• Instrument pushes treatment only in one direction (monotonicity)
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Reminder: Instrumental Variable
First stage:
Di = α1 + φZi + γ1Xi + e1i (6)
where Di is the endogenous variable, Zi is the IV
From the first stage we get:
D̂i = α1 + φZi + γ1Xi (7)
Second stage (which includes Xi):
Yi = α2 + λSLSD̂i + γ2Xi + e2i (8)
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Judge Fixed Effects
• Example: impact of invalidity on forward citations
citesi = β0 + β1invalidi + β2Xi + εi (9)
where citesi forward cites for litigated patent i, invalidatedi equal to
one if patent i was invalidated, and Xi are patent characteristics
• OLS estimate of β1 biased if E(β1εi) 6= 0






• where nj is the total number of cases decided by judge j
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Summary
• Lots of interesting questions (testing theory, policy, etc.)
• Selection poses fundamental problems to any type of analysis of
patent litigation data
• Good idea to combine empirical analysis with theory
• But you can still use standard empirical tool set to address selection
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